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过度担保的审批要求，完善公司治理机制的建设。本文共分 6 章内容： 











































Practical experience and theoretical studies have shown that providing security 
for the related company had become a major mean of tunneling. Listed companies 
turn to guarantee to subsidiaries after the promulgating of policies aimed at restricting 
related-party guarantees. Regarding last guarantee policy as background and using the 
data of guarantee to subsidiaries in 2004-2006, this article investigates the relationship 
between the degree of guarantee to subsidiaries and the value of listed companies in 
the hope of offering empirical evidence for theoretical studies and the supervision 
policies. The result suggests that there are two effects in guarantee to subsidiaries, 
efficiency and tunneling. The efficiency effect play a leading role to increase the 
company value when the guarantee is appropriate, on the contrary the tunneling effect 
play a leading role to decrease the company value when over-security. In another 
word there exists an inverted U-relationship between the value of listed companies 
and the degree of guarantee to subsidiaries. For this reason, this article advises that the 
supervision departments strengthen the information disclosure system and strengthen 
the assessment and approval system to supervise the over-guarantee. This article was 
divided into five chapters: 
In the first chapter, we introduce the motives of the research and propose the 
research framework of the article. 
In the second chapter, we had a literature review on “tunneling” and 
“related-party guarantee”. 
The third chapter is about the institutional background of our country’s related 
party guarantee. We analyze Chinese internal and external corporate governance 
mechanisms of listed companies. And we divide the development of external 
guarantee of Chinese listed company into three stages, and we distinguish the feature 
of the three stages and policies. 
In the fourth chapter, we bring forward two hypothesis of the relationship 
between the degree of guarantee to subsidiaries and the value of listed companies. 















2004-2006 as our samples. 
In the fifth chapter, we establish logit equations to test our two hypothesis. 
In the last part we get the conclusions: there exists an inverted U-relationship 
between the value of listed companies and the degree of guarantee to subsidiaries. The 
supervision departments strengthen the information disclosure system and strengthen 
the assessment and approval system to supervise the over-guarantee. 
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第 1 章 引 言 
 1





2000 年 6 月 6 日中国证监会发布了《关于上市公司为他人提供担保有关问
题的通知》（以下简称《通知 1》），通知 1 明确规定：“上市公司不得以公司资产
为本公司的股东、股东的控股子公司、股东的附属企业或者个人债务提供担保”。 
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